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Notes
THE KENNEDY KRIEGER CASE: JUDICIAL ANGER AND THE
RESEARCH ENTERPRISE
JACK SCHWARTZ, J.D.**
"One cool judgment," President Woodrow Wilson once remarked, "is worth a
thousand hasty counsels. The thing to be supplied is light, not heat."' In Grimes v.
Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc.,2 a well-intended but flawed critique of pediatric
research ethics, the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals was anything but
cool. The Court's rhetoric was heated, its historical comparisons inflammatory and
unjust, and aspects of its decision ill-considered. Yet, from this heat comes a light
of sorts: an illumination of the need for greater rigor in the procedures for
protecting research participants, especially children and other vulnerable subjects.
This article, after summarizing the case as it came to the Court of Appeals,
discusses the principal elements of the Court's opinion:
" Holding on researcher's duty - a decisive opinion on the question
presented on appeal, whether researchers potentially have a duty of
care toward subjects participating in the kind of research conducted by
the Kennedy Krieger Institute (hereinafter "KKI");
* Dictum stated as "holding" on parental authority - an authoritative
discussion, beyond that needed to decide the question presented, about
the basis on which parents or other legal guardians may consent to the
participation of children in research;
" Commentary on research ethics - a discursive analysis of the ethics of
this KKI research, the ethical review that this research received, and
the protection of subjects in the research enterprise generally, striking
for its scathing tone and sweeping criticism.
* The views expressed in this article are personal, not official.
** Assistant Attorney General and Director, Health Policy Development, Maryland Attorney General's
Office; B.A., University of Maryland Baltimore County; J.D., Yale Law School.
1. An Address in Pittsburgh on Preparedness (Jan. 29, 1916), in 36 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW
WILSON 33 (Arthur S. Link ed.) (1981).
2. 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001). The decision of the Court of Appeals encompassed two separate
appeals, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger, Inc., No. 128-2000, and Higgins v. Kennedy Krieger, Inc., No.
129-2000. See infra text accompanying notes 16-28. The Court's main opinion was issued on August
16, 2001. On October I1, 2001, the Court supplemented its opinion with a brief explanation for its
denial of a motion for partial reconsideration filed by the Kennedy Krieger Institute. See infra text
accompanying notes 83-87.
JUDICIAL ANGER AND THE RESEARCH ENTERPRISE
The article concludes by addressing the implications of the decision for
research involving children and other vulnerable subjects.
I. FACTS AND TRIAL COURT DECISION
A. Lead Abatement Study
The prevention of lead poisoning is an important public health goal.3 KKI, a
renowned pediatric research and treatment facility affiliated with the Johns
Hopkins University, had long treated lead poisoned children. 4 Many of KKI's
patients came from low-income neighborhoods in Baltimore, where 95% of the
housing stock had lead paint. 5
Researchers at KKI published a study in 1990 indicating that traditional
methods of removing lead paint, such as scraping or burning, could potentially
increase the risk to children through exposure to the lead dust produced by these
methods.6 Following up on that research, KKI obtained a grant from the
Environmental Protection Agency to study various methods of lead abatement that
were hypothesized to be more effective- that is, to provide a substantial reduction
in lead exposure through nontraditional methods made affordable to inner-city
landlords.7
This hypothesis, however, like countless other health-related hypotheses that
are plausible in theory, finds solid support only if tested in empirical research.
Consequently, researchers at KKI designed a study protocol as follows: Three
groups of houses, all known to have lead paint, received prescribed but varying
amounts of maintenance and repair.8 Two additional groups of houses were
included as controls: One group was deemed completely abated of its prior lead
paint, and the other group consisted of more modem housing where lead paint had
never been used. 9 The Court of Appeals explained:
3. "Significant exposure to lead is a preventable environmental threat to optimal health and
developmental outcomes for young children." COMM. ENVTL. HEALTH, Screening for Elevated Blood
Lead Levels, 101 PEDIATRICS 1072, 1072 (1988).
4. KKI, Lead-Based Paint Study Fact Sheet, at
http://www.kennedykrieger.org/whatsnew/newsreleases/latestnews/leadfactssheet.htm (hereinafter KKI
Fact Sheet) (last visited July 7, 2002).
5. Id
6. See generally Mark R. Farfel & J. Julien Chisolm, Jr., Health and Environmental Outcomes of
Traditional and Modified Practices for Abatement of Residential-Lead Based Paint, 80 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1240 (1990).
7. KKI Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
8. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 820.
9. Id.
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The goal of the research was to determine the effectiveness of differing
degrees of lead paint abatement in reducing lead dust levels in the
houses. The ultimate aim of the research was to find a less than
complete level of abatement that would be relatively safe, but
economical, so that Baltimore landlords with lower socioeconomical
rental units would not abandon the units.'0
According to the Court, families with at least one young child were recruited
for the study." The children participating in the study had the lead levels in their
blood periodically tested, and the results were compared to the testing results of
lead in dust samples from the houses, exterior soil, and drinking water.' 2 The
Court determined these research protocols resulted in a research environment
focused on abatement of lead dust.' 3  The success of the various abatement
procedures were largely measured, not by the reduction of lead levels in the
children's blood, but by periodic blood lead level measurements. 4 KKI offered
small inducements for parents to keep their children in the study- periodic
payments of $5 and $15 for the time spent responding to questionnaires and what
the Court characterized as "a stream of compensation flowing to the research
subjects and the parents" in the form of gifts, trinkets, and food coupons.' 5
B. Litigation in Lower Court
Ericka Grimes was an infant, living in a supposedly fully abated house on
Monroe Street, when her mother agreed that she would participate in the KKI lead
abatement study.16 In March 1993, testing of dust samples from the house:
[R]evealed what the researchers referred to as 'hot spots' where the
level of lead 'was higher than might be found in a completely .. .
[abated] house.' This information about the 'hot spots' was not
furnished to [Ericka's mother] until ... more than nine months after the
samples had been collected and ... not until after Ericka Grime's blood
was found to contain elevated levels of lead.'
7
10. Id. at 820-21. According to KKI, "As expected, lead abatement measures resulted in
significant reductions in the lead dust for all five types of property treatments. Overall the blood levels
of most children residing in the study homes stayed constant or went down, even though in a few cases,
they rose." KKI Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
II. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 823.
12. Id. at 822.
13. Id. at 819.
14. Id. at 819.
15. Id. at 843.
16. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 823.
17. Id. at 825.
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After learning of Ericka's elevated blood lead levels, her mother sued KKI
"for negligence for failing to warn of, or abate, lead paint hazards that KKI
allegedly discovered in the Monroe Street property during the research study."' 8
KKI filed a third-party complaint against the landlord, and Ericka filed an amended
complaint to add the landlord as an additional defendant.' 9 However, Ericka
subsequently dismissed claims against the landlord.2 ° In a motion for summary
judgment, KKI argued that it did not breach any duty that it owed to Ericka.2'
Persuaded by this argument, the circuit court granted KKI's motion and entered
judgment in its favor.22
Myron Higgins was four-years-old when his mother agreed to his
participation in the KKI study.23 Myron, his mother, and his siblings moved into a
house on Federal Street with lead hazards that were partially abated under one arm
of the KKI study.24 After becoming aware that lead levels in Myron's blood were
elevated, Myron and his mother sued KKI, the organization that had performed the
abatement, and the landlord for several negligent acts,25 including inadequate
abatement methods and a failure to warn Myron and his mother of the lead hazard
on the premises.26 In its summary judgment motion, KKI argued that it owed no
duty to Myron or his mother. 27 The circuit court granted the motion and entered
judgment in favor of KKI.2
The plaintiffs in both cases appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,
Maryland's intermediate appellate court. Prior to that court's consideration, the
Court of Appeals took jurisdiction over the appeals on its own motion.29 Because
the cases were decided on summary judgment, the record on appeal was, as
characterized by the Court, "not extensive.
II. THE COURT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE RESEARCH
Every aspect of the Court's opinion was affected by its understanding of the
nature of KKI's research. According to the Court, KKI's study was
18. Id. at 825-26.
19. Id. at 826.
20. Id. at 825-26.
21. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 825-26.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 827-28.
24. Id. at 827.
25. Id. at 828-29.
26. Id. at 829. As in Grimes, the plaintiffs alleged that KKI negligently failed to disclose
information about lead dust levels found in the house. Id.
27. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 831.
28. Id. at 832.
29. Higgins v. Kennedy Krieger Institute Inc., 766 A.2d 147 (Md. 2001).
30. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 820.
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"nontherapeutic research using minors,",31 as distinguished from what the Court
termed "therapeutic research. 3
The Court understood the nature of "therapeutic research" by reference to its
supposed purpose, "to directly help or aid a patient who is suffering from a health
condition the objectives of the research are designed to address - hopefully by the
alleviation, or potential alleviation of the health condition., 33 "Nontherapeutic
research," by contrast, generally uses subjects not known to have the condition the
research is designed to address. 34 Additionally, nontherapeutic research is
designed to produce benefits for the public at large, and is not designed to directly
benefit the subjects utilized in the research.35
The Court's categorization of research into "therapeutic" and
"nontherapeutic" is conceptually flawed and ignores more than two decades'
criticism of this approach.36 The term "therapeutic research" fails to give due
account to the differences between research and clinical care, in terms of both
goals and methods. Although a clinical trial might be conducted with a reasonable
expectation that those who receive the test article will be therapeutically benefited,
the primary goal of the trial, like all other research, is the acquisition of
generalizable scientific knowledge, following research procedures that may not
accord with the goals of therapeutic care for individual participants. 37 Moreover,
in clinical care, treatment is determined by reference to the personal situation of
the patient, whereas in research, treatment is determined by reference to the
procedures specified in the research protocol. 38  Thus, even "studies with
therapeutic components often have features that are not routine therapy, such as
extra procedures, tests, or hospitalizations.
'
"
39
As will be discussed later in this article, the Court's imprecise language,
coupled with its restriction on parental authority, contributed to the confusion and
dismay among researchers in the wake of the decision.40 The Court might have
markedly improved its analysis of the issues had it avoided the terms "therapeutic"
and "nontherapeutic," and instead followed the more careful approach of the
31. Id. at 811.
32. Id. at 811-12.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Loretta M. Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny: Grimes
Narrows Their Interpretation, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 38, 41 (2002).
37. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2001) (providing the definition of "research" for purposes of
federal regulations); Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, What Makes Placebo-Controlled Trials
Unethical?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Spring 2002, at 3, 6 ("[T]he intent or purpose of administering
treatments in clinical trials is not to provide personalized therapeutic benefit but to test hypotheses
concerning safety and efficacy of treatment in groups of patients.").
38. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2001).
39. Kopelman, supra note 36, at 41.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 78-82.
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federal regulations on the protection of human research subjects. These
regulations simply identify the possibility that some research may provide direct
benefits to the subjects.41 This usage might have opened the Court's eyes to the
possibility that, although the KKI research could not by any means be deemed
therapeutic for the participants, who had no illness and therefore had no need for
therapy, the research might well have held out a reasonable prospect of a direct,
health-related benefit, at least for the children in the abated properties.42
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING ON RESEARCHER'S DUTY
The Court reviewed the elements of a negligence claim under Maryland law,
including the element "that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff
from injury."43 Because the trial court had resolved the cases "solely on the
grounds that there was no legal duty to protect the children," the only issue
remaining was "whether KKI was under a duty to protect [the children] from
injury.' 44
The Court quickly concluded that the relationship between KKI and the
children was one in which "a duty or duties would ordinarily exist, and certainly
could exist, based on the facts and circumstances of each of these individual
cases."45 As the Court viewed the facts of the two cases, a special relationship
imposing a duty on the researchers could be inferred, and, indeed, ordinarily would
be created in similar research programs involving human subjects. 6
One possible source of the special relationship giving rise to a duty of care is
the consent document, characterized by the Court as a "bilateral contract between
the parties.""7 The Court did not elaborate on how the existence of this contract
gives rise to a duty enforceable in tort, as distinct from a cause of action for breach
of contract.
48
41. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111 (a)(2), 46.116(a)(3), 46.405 (2001).
42. KKI has asserted that the lead abatement study "would provide benefits to the Study
participants since all participants would live in housing that had been improved or was new and would
be monitored for blood lead levels on an ongoing basis." KKI Fact Sheet, supra note 4. One
commentator has agreed that "all the children who lived in residences that received lead abatement
could have potentially benefited from their participation." Lainie Friedman Ross, In Defense of the
Hopkins LeadAbatement Studies, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 50, 51 (2002).
43. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 841. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (Md. 1994)
(internal quotations omitted)). The other elements of a negligence claim are that the defendant breached
the duty of care, that the plaintiffs suffered actual injury or loss, and that the injury or loss proximately
resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty. Id.
44. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 841.
45. Id. at 842.
46. Id. at 843.
47. Id.
48. "There is no single principle or simple test for determining when a defendant's breach of a
contract will also breach an independent duty and give rise to a tort action." Mesmer v. Maryland Auto.
Ins. Fund, 725 A.2d 1053, 1059 (Md. 1999). Presumably, the trial court might find on remand that KKI
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A second possible source of duty is the nature of "nontherapeutic research"
itself.49 As the Court summarized, "the trial courts appeared to have held that
special relationships out of which duties arise cannot be created by the relationship
between researchers and the subjects of the research." 50 The Court conceded that
the trial courts' view of "special relationships" may indeed hold true, but only "in
some rare cases . . . . 5 Instead, the Court stressed that the trial courts' limited
view of "special relationships" does not govern instances in which researchers
recruit subjects, "especially children whose consent is furnished indirectly, to
participate in nontherapeutic procedures that are potentially hazardous, dangerous,
or deleterious to their health. 52 Recruiting "otherwise healthy subjects to interact
with already existing or potentially existing hazardous conditions, or both, for the
purpose of creating statistics from which scientific hypotheses can be supported,
would normally warrant or create such special relationships as a matter of law." 53
The Court suggested that a duty of care might also be grounded in the federal
regulations "that impose standards of care that attach to federally funded or
sponsored research projects that use human subjects. 54 The Court specifically
cited the policy on protection of human research subjects adopted as regulations by
the Department of Health and Human Services and a number of other federal
agencies, known as Common Rule.5
The Court also identified the regulations applicable to pediatric research
conducted or sponsored by that Department.5 6 The Court concluded that a special
relationship resulting in a duty of care is imposed by the federal regulation: "The
question becomes whether this duty of informed consent created by federal
regulation, as a matter of State law, translates into a duty of care arising out of the
negligently performed its obligations under the consent document, which sounds in tort. See Matyas v.
Suburban Trust Co., 263 A.2d 16, 18 (Md. 1970).
49. For a discussion of this terminology, see supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
50. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 845.
51. Id. The Court suggested that a relationship might not exist if all the researchers were doing was
compiling "already extant statistics for purposes of studying human health matters." id. at 846. The
Court did not explain why this type of research using individually identifiable data, which if done
negligently can result in the loss of privacy and other harms, might not give rise to a duty of care.
52. Id. at 845-46.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 846. See also Daum v. SpineCare Med. Group, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Cal. App. 1997).
55. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpt. A (2001). The Court noted that EPA-sponsored research
"presumably" is subject to the Common Rule. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 847. This presumption is correct, for
the EPA has adopted the Common Rule in its own regulations. 40 C.F.R. pt. 26 (2001).
56. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpt. D (2001). There is no comparable EPA regulation; hence, there is
no discernable basis for the Court's assumption that a regulation which, on its face, is not applicable to
EPA-funded research nevertheless applied. One can speculate, however, that KKI had agreed with the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to apply Subpart D to all of its research, regardless
of funding source. See 40 C.F.R. § 26.103(a)-(b) (2001); 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a)-(b) (2001).
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unique relationship that is researcher-subject, as opposed to doctor-patient. We
answer that question in the affirmative."57
Finally, the Court identified the Nuremberg Code as a potential source of the
duty of care.58 The Court held as follows: "The breach of obligations imposed on
researchers by the Nuremberg Code, might well support actions sounding in
negligence in cases such as those at issue here., 59  With this thoroughgoing
rejection of the trial court's ruling that researchers owed no duty of care to their
subjects, the Court of Appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment and
remanded the cases for trial.60  Had the Court acted as it normally does in cases
involving a trial court's erroneous grant of summary judgment, it would have
resolved the case and said no more.6' Indeed, one judge, who concurred in the
result only, would have limited the decision to "the narrow question" of whether
the grant of summary judgment to KKI was erroneous "on the ground that, as a
matter of law, it owed no duty to warn... [the] human subjects participating in its
research study."62 Had the Court done so, its decision would have been largely
welcomed as a reasonable step to promote human research subject protection. It
was the Court's venture beyond the issue presented that had the greatest potential
impact on the conduct of research.63
57. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 849.
58. Id. The Nuremberg Code is a set of precepts published by the Nuremberg Tribunal following
the trials of the Nazi doctors found guilty of various atrocities in the course of experimentation on
humans. The Court set out the entire test of the Nuremberg Code in footnote 31. Id. at 835.
59. Id. at 849. The Court did not discuss the importance of the Nuremberg Code's first provision:
"[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person
involved should have the legal capacity to give consent...." Id. at 853. Taken literally, it would preclude
not only the KKI lead abatement study but also all other research involving children. Jonathan D.
Moreno, Regulation of Research on the Decisionally Impaired: History and Gaps in the Current
Regulatory System, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 12 (1998). Because the Nuremberg Code was
announced in the wake of experimental atrocities using coerced prisoners, however, its intended scope
is likely narrower than its literal text suggests, and its first provision should not be applied out of
context as a bar to all research in which the subjects themselves cannot give consent.
60. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858.
61. See, e.g., Schmerling v. Injured Workers' Ins. Fund, 795 A.2d 715 (Md. 2002); see also
Hagerstown v. Hagerstown, 793 A.2d 579 (Md. 2002).
62. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858-59 (Raker, J., concurring).
63. This is not to suggest that the Court's holding on duty is without interest or importance. To the
contrary, the holding is rich with nuance and interpretive difficulties. Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H.
Rothenberg, Whose Duty Is It Anyway?: The Kennedy Krieger Opinion and Its Implications for Public
Health Research, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 109 (2003).
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IV. "HOLDING" ON PARENTAL AUTHORITY
A. The Court's Strong Dictum
The Court began its analysis by pointing out "that the 'best interests of the
child' is the overriding concern of this Court in matters relating to children. '64 The
interests of a parent, the Court continued, and "the interests of the general public in
fostering research, according to a researcher's hypothesis to be for the good of all
children," are to be subordinated to the child's best interest.65 The Court declared
that "[i]t is not in the best interest of any healthy child to be intentionally put in a
nontherapeutic situation where his or her health may be impaired, in order to test
methods that may ultimately benefit all children." 66 Moving to the particulars of
the lead abatement research, the Court opined: "One simply does not expose
otherwise healthy children, incapable of personal [consent], to a nontherapeutic
research environment that is known at the inception of the research, might cause
the children to ingest lead dust .... Such a practice is not legally acceptable.,
67
In the Court's view, the core problem had nothing to do with any
inadequacies in the informed consent process. The experiment itself could not be
made legally or ethically permissible no matter what degree of parental consent or
supplemental information was furnished to the parents involved, because "It was
wrong in the first instance.,
68
Curiously, given this unyielding language, the Court discussed and
distinguished three cases where other courts had approved parental decisions to
subject one sibling to a medical procedure without therapeutic purpose for the
benefit of another sibling.69 The Court commented that the "primary importance"
of these cases was "not that the parents or guardians consented to the procedures,
but that they first sought permission of the courts and received that permission,
before consenting to a nontherapeutic procedure in respect to some of their minor
children, but that was therapeutic to their other children., 70 By contrast, the Court
64. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 853.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The Court's casual reference to children, who are "incapable of personal assent (consent),
as if these terms are synonymous, blurs an important distinction. In the regulations governing pediatric
research funded by federal DHHS, only parents or legal guardians may give consent (in the terminology
of the regulations, "permission"). 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.402(b), 46.408(b). A child who lacks the legal
capacity to give informed consent to research participation might nonetheless be capable of giving
assent- that is, an affirmative agreement to participate in research. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.402(b),
46.408(a). The children who were plaintiffs in the litigation, however, were too young even for assent at
the time of research participation.
68. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 857-58.
69. See Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Supp. 1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky.
1969); Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
70. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 854-55.
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observed, "in the case sub judice, no impartial judicial review or oversight was
sought by the researchers or by the parents.",7 1 If, however, the participation of
children in this research was "not legally acceptable" and "wrong in the first
instance," as stated by the Court, it is difficult to discern, even putting aside
practical considerations, how the insertion of a judicial review mechanism into the
consent procedures would conceivably lead to a different result.
The more direct precedent, in the Court's view, was a portion of a New York
intermediate appellate court decision, TD. v. Office of Mental Health.72  The
appellate court found "unacceptable" regulatory provisions that allowed parents to
consent to the participation of their children in "greater than minimal risk non-
therapeutic research. 73 The court held:
We are not dealing here with parental choice among reasonable
treatment alternatives, but with a decision to subject the child to non-
therapeutic treatments and procedures that may cause harmful
permanent or fatal side-effects. It follows therefore that a parent ... may
not consent to have a child submit to painful and/or potentially life-
threatening research procedures that hold no prospect of benefit for the
child ....
The Court of Appeals "concur[red] with that assessment." 75 The Court ended
its discussion on the lack of parental authority with what it explicitly labeled a
"holding," notwithstanding that the entire discussion was dictum:76 "we hold that
in Maryland a parent, appropriate relative, or applicable surrogate, cannot consent
to the participation of a child or other person under legal disability in
71. Id. at 812.
72. 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed, 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997),
leave to appeal granted, 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997), appeal dismissed, 668 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y.
1997).
73. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
74. Id. at 192.
75. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 856. The Court was unaware of, or indifferent to, the fact that the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court characterized this and similar portions of the
intermediate appellate court's decision as "an inappropriate advisory opinion." T.D., 668 N.Y.S.2d at
154.
76. Dictum "refers to a statement made by a court 'incidentally or collaterally, and nor directly
upon the question before [it], or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the
cause." Holliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 770 A.2d 1071, 1086 (Md. App. 2001) (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1072 (6th ed. 1990)). Dictum "lacks the authority of adjudication... [and] is not
entitled to the precedential weight afforded the holding because it does not receive the 'deliberate and
considered judgment' used in phrasing the holding." Holliday, 770 A.2d at 1086 (quoting State v.
Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 7 (Md. App. 1995)). See also, e.g., Stover v. Stover, 483 A.2d 783 (Md. App.
1984). Because the question before the Court was the correctness of the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to KKI based on lack of duty, the Court's statements about parental authority meet the
definition of dictum.
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nontherapeutic research or studies in which there is any risk of injury or damage to
the health of the subject."77
B. Reaction in the Research Community and the Court's "Explanation"
The Court's summary pronouncement appalled many researchers and their
lawyers. They feared that the Court, by failing to clarify the scope of
"nontherapeutic research," had foreclosed a wide swathe of research. For example,
in its motion for partial reconsideration, KKI lamented, "On the day the mandate in
this case issues, hundreds of fully accredited medical projects now conducted in
Maryland will terminate. 7 8 Other proponents of pediatric research took the view
that parents would no longer have authority to enroll children in a randomized
controlled trial with a placebo arm, because "[f]or the placebo recipients, the
research ... in the language of the Court, is "nontherapeutic. 79 In addition, these
proponents pointed out, the Court's prohibition of parental consent in
nontherapeutic research involving "any risk of injury or damage to the health of the
subject,, 80 taken literally, "is inconsistent with medical research. The blunt fact is
that there is almost no research without risk."8' As another research institution
pointed out, "even a simple questionnaire, ...depending on its subject matter,
might pose the slight risk of temporarily upsetting a child.,
82
77. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858. It is inexplicable why the Court, piling dictum upon dictum, included
this passing reference to an "other applicable surrogate" and an "other person under legal disability."
The case was solely about pediatric research, and it is facile to assume that issues involving adults who
lack decisional capacity are incidental. See generally NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N,
RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING
CAPACITY (1998), available at http:/Ibioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/capacity/volumeii.pdf (last visited
Sept. 15, 2002); see also, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann et al., Regulating Research with Decisionally
Impaired Individuals: Are We Making Progress?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 547 (2000); Evan G.
DeRenzo, Decisionally Impaired Persons in Research: Refining the Proposed Refinements, 25 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 139 (1997).
78. Appellee's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Modification of Opinion at 1, Grimes (No.
128) [hereinafter KKI Motion]. In its motion KKI explicitly abandoned its prior position that it owed no
legal duty to the research subjects. KKI has elsewhere characterized its prior position as a "legalistic"
and a "technical argument" that it now "regrets." KKI Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
79. Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Medical Colleges et al., in Support of Motion
for Reconsideration at 7, Grimes, (No. 128).
80. Grimes, 782 A.2d. at 858.
81. Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Medical Colleges et al., supra note 79, at 11.
82. Brief of University of Maryland, Baltimore as Amicus Curiae in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration at 11, Grimes, (No. 128). See Memorandum of the National Center for Lead-safe
Housing as Amicus Curiae Urging Partial Reconsideration and Modification of Opinion, Grimes (No.
128), available at http://www.kennedykrieger.org/whatsnew/newreleases/latestnews/leadsafebrief.htm
(last visited Sept. 30, 2002); see also Memorandum of Law of Public Justice Center in Partial Support
of Appellee's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Modification of Opinion, Grimes, (No. 128),
available at http://www.kennedykrieger.org/whatsnew/newsreleases/latestnews/leadPJCmemo.htm (last
visited Sept. 30, 2002).
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The Court denied KKI's motion.83 In doing so, the Court clarified the kind of
research in which parental consent was prohibited and allayed the worst fears of
researchers. "The context of the statement," the Court explained, "was a
nontherapeutic study that promises no medical benefit to the child whatever, so
that any balance between risk and benefit is necessarily negative. ' '84 Presumably,
this explanation implies that parents are not prohibited from permitting their
children to participate in research, like many randomized clinical trials, that holds
out a reasonable prospect of direct medical benefit. In research of that kind, the
"balance between risk and benefit" might turn out to be negative, but it is not
85
"necessarily negative" a priori.
Furthermore, the Court explained that when it said "any risk," it "meant any
articulable risk beyond the minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any endeavor."
86
The phrase "minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any endeavor" appears to refer
to the concept, set forth in the Common Rule, that minimal risk "means that the
probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not
greater in of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during
the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.,
87
C. The Court as Self-Initiated Lawgiver: An Error of Good Intentions
"Absent exceptional circumstances," the Court of Appeals recently wrote in
another case in which it reversed a trial court's grant of summary judgment, "an
appellate court will review a grant of summary judgment only upon the grounds
relied upon by the trial court."88 As discussed above,89 the trial court resolved the
negligence claims by finding that KKI had no legal duty toward the plaintiffs; the
trial court never ruled on the question of the parents' authority to enroll their
children in this research.
So, what was the "exceptional circumstance" that caused the Court of
Appeals to take up the issue of parental authority? Apparently, it was the Court's
belief that it needed to rescue children from the danger presented by amoral
scientists and compliant parents. The Court began this portion of its opinion with
this declaration:
83. Grimes, 782 A.2d. at 861.
84. Id. at 862.
85. See Robert M. Nelson, Nontherapeutic Research, Minimal Risk, and the Kennedy Krieger
Lead Abatement Study, 23 IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN RES. 7, 10 (2001) (discussing the circumstances
under which a placebo-controlled clinical trial may be deemed to hold out the prospect of direct benefits
- that is, to be "therapeutic," in the Court's terminology).
86. Grimes, 782 A.2d. at 862.
87. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2001).
88. Hagerstown, 793 A.2d at 588; See also, e.g., Paine Webber Inc. v. East, 768 A.2d 1029, 1036
(Md. 2001); Bishop v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 757 A.2d 783, 787-88 (Md. 2000); Gresser v. Anne
Arundel County, 709 A.2d 740, 745 (Md. 1998).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 16-25.
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The issue of whether a parent can consent to the participation of her or
his child in a nontherapeutic health-related study that is known to be
potentially hazardous to the health of the child raises serious questions
with profound moral and ethical implications. What right does a parent
have to knowingly expose a child not in need of therapy to health risks
or otherwise knowingly place a child in danger, even if it is for the
greater good? 90
Given this view of what is at stake, the Court's venture into self-initiated
lawmaking was both understandable and, in principle, justified. The Court was
correct in discerning the importance of a clear delineation of parental authority to
consent to a child's participation in research. The federal regulations governing
human subject research defer to "any State or local laws or regulations which may
otherwise be applicable and which provide additional protections for human
subjects." 91 Well-crafted judicial limits on parental authority, to protect children
against potentially hazardous research not justified by the reasonable prospect of
direct medical benefit, would be a welcome common law protection.
Yet, it is folly for any court to venture into this contentious area without a
solid basis on which to proceed. If a court is to sensibly balance the competing
policy considerations -advancing scientific progress to improve the health of
children, while protecting children against exploitation and genuine harm -it needs
education about the issue that can only be provided by a full evidentiary record and
focused argument. A court should also carefully consider the relationship between
its legal pronouncements and other relevant law, especially the federal regulations
governing most pediatric research.92  Finally, a court needs to word its opinion
with precision, so that researchers and their lawyers can understand the new
limitations and apply them to a wide variety of research endeavors.
The Court of Appeals fell short on all of these criteria. The Court
acknowledged with considerable understatement that the "issue of the parent's
right to consent on behalf of the children has not been fully presented in either of
90. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 852. The Court's suggestion that the mothers of Ericka and Myron had
"knowingly" placed their children in danger was at odds with the Court's earlier description of the
inadequacy of the consent document: "Nowhere in the consent form was it clearly disclosed to the
mother that the researchers contemplated that, as a result of the experiment, the child might accumulate
lead in her blood, and that in order for the experiment to succeed it was necessary that the child remain
in the house as the lead in the child's blood increased or decreased, so that it could be measured." Id. at
824.
91. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(f) (2001).
92. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 50, subpt. D (2001) (interim rule) (governing pediatric research regulated by
the FDA); 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpt. D (2001) (governing pediatric research funded by the DHHS).
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these cases." 93  Nowhere in its discussion of parental authority, including its
explanation in denying KKI's motion for partial reconsideration, did the Court
attempt to correlate its limitations to the categories in the federal regulations.94
The Court's careless drafting of its summary holding led to justifiable alarm
among researchers and the need for the later "explanation" by the Court, itself far
from precisely stated, intended to allow most pediatric research in Maryland to
proceed. That the Court's holding, as later explained, can be correlated with the
federal regulations owes more to the insight of commentators than any mindful
effort on the Court's part.
95
This aspect of the Court's opinion may indeed, as one commentator put it,
have "asked the right question about the moral authority of parents" and have come
to a defensible answer, one consistent with mainstream ethical views.96 Yet, the
moral authority of the Court risks erosion when indignation blinds it to the
"passive virtue" of judicial self-restraint. 97
V. THE COURT'S COMMENTARY ON RESEARCH ETHICS
A. The Ethics of KKI's Research
In its denial of KKI's motion for partial reconsideration, the Court noted that
"every issue bearing on liability or damages remains open for further factual
development, and any relevant evidence not otherwise precluded under our rules of
evidence is admissible." 98 Indeed, the Court protested, despite its discussion of
"the various issues and arguments in considerable detail, the only conclusion that
we reached as a matter of law, was that on the record currently before us, summary
judgment was improperly granted .. . ."99 This more cautious language retracted
nothing, however, from the Court's denunciation of the ethics of the KKI research.
Evidence of judicial indignation is abundant. Despite the very limited record
before it, the Court did not hesitate to declare that the KKI research protocols were
93. Grimes, 782 A.2d. at 852 (Raker, J., dissenting). As the dissenting judge stated, more
forthrightly: "Inasmuch as these issues were never raised by the pleadings or parties below, this Court
had no basis [on which] to address these very complex issues...." Id. at 862.
94. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.404-46.406 (governing research not involving greater than minimal risk;
involving greater than minimal risk but presenting the prospect of direct benefit to the individual
subjects; and research involving greater than minimal risk and no prospect of direct benefit to individual
subjects, but likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the subject's disorder or condition).
95. See Kopelman, supra note 36, at 47.
96. See Nelson, supra note 85, at 11.
97. See Alexander Bickel, Forward. The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 79 (1961) (The
Supreme Court, "in deciding whether, when, and how much to adjudicate," should rely on
considerations that are not "predelictional, sentimental, or irrational."). Id
98. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 861.
99. Id.
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"not legally acceptable,"' 00 "not appropriate, '0 and "innately inappropriate."' 0 2
Furthermore, the Court flatly stated that KKI had not complied with federal
regulations regarding informed consent and the ethical conduct of research. 1
03
Moreover, the Court's rhetorical flourishes about the KKI research were
scathing. The children who were the subjects of the research were likened to
"canaries in a mine," exposed to serious harm as a sentinel for the benefit of
others.' 4 The children, it is said, were "used as guinea pigs."' 0 5 The Court could
not resist adding: "Children, it should be noted, are not in our society the
equivalent of rats, hamsters, monkeys, and the like."' 0 6 The Court also described
the children as having been "enticed into living in, or remaining in, potentially
lead-tainted housing and intentionally subjected to a research program, which
contemplates the probability, or even the possibility, of lead poisoning .... ,,107
The parents were said to have been "improperly enticed by trinkets, food stamps,
money or other items ....108 No form of parental consent and no consent process
"could make the experiment at issue here, ethically or legally permissible. It was
wrong in the first instance."'
0 9
The Court's indignation is further evidenced by its explicit comparison of the
KKI research to the worst abuses in the history of human experimentation. In the
Court's view, the KKI research:
[D]iffers in large degree from but presents similar problems as those in
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study ... the intentional exposure of solders to
radiation in the 1940s and 50s ...the tests involving the exposure of
Navajo miners to radiation ... and the secret administration of LSD to
soldiers by the CIA and the Army in the 1950s and 60s .... 0
As if this were not damning enough, the Court went on to identify other
grossly unethical experiments that "were also prior instances of research subjects
100. Id. at 853.
101. Id. at 855.
102. Id.
103. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 848.
104. Id. at 813. "It can be argued that the researchers intended that the children be the canaries in
the mines but never clearly told the parents." Id. It was a practice in earlier years, and perhaps even
now, for subsurface miners to rely on canaries to determine whether dangerous levels of toxic gases
were accumulating in the mines. Canaries were particularly susceptible to such gases. When the
canaries began to die, miners knew that dangerous levels of gases were accumulating. Id.
105. Id. at 852.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 814.
108. Id.
109. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858.
110. Id. at 816.
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[sic] being intentionally exposed to infectious or poisonous substances in the name
of scientific research."'' The Court then named the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,
where effective treatment was deliberately withheld from patients affected with
syphilis; the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital Study, in which seriously ill patients
were injected with cancer cells without their consent; the Japanese military's use of
"plague bombs" in World War II; and typhus experiments by the Nazis at
Buchenwald concentration camp. "
2
The similarity to these notorious examples of research abuse extended, in the
Court's view, not only to KKI's research methodology but also to the type of
subjects involved:
These programs were somewhat alike in the vulnerability of the
subjects; uneducated African-American men, debilitated patients in a
charity hospital, prisoners of war, inmates of concentration camps and
others falling within the custody and control of the agencies conducting
or approving the experiments. In the present case, children, especially
young children, living in lower economic circumstances, albeit not as
vulnerable as the other examples, are nonetheless, vulnerable as well."
13
In addition, the Court denounced the supervisory Institutional Review Board
(IRB) at the Johns Hopkins University, which "abdicated [its] responsibility,
instead suggesting to the researchers a way to miscast the characteristics of the
study in order to avoid the responsibility inherent in nontherapeutic research
involving children."' '4  The Court chastised Hopkins' IRB, "whose primary
function was to insure safety and compliance with applicable regulations," because
it encouraged the researchers to misrepresent the purpose of the research in an
effort to label the study 'therapeutic' and thus subject to a lower safety standard of
regulation. The IRB's purpose was ethically wrong .... .5 The Court also
suggested that KKI acted without due regard for the well-being of the children
because it was influenced by financial interests. The Court made a point of noting
the lack of a:
[C]omplete record of the specific compensation of the researchers
involved .... Neither is there in the record any development of what
pressures, if any, were exerted in respect to the researchers obtaining the
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 816-17.
113. Id. at 817.
114. Id. at 813. The Court was upset with IRB's suggestion that the children living in "control
group housing" (that is, houses thought to be free of lead paint) be characterized as gaining some
benefit from their participation in the study.
115. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 817.
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consents of the parents and conducting the experiments. Nor, for the
same reason, is there a sufficient indication as to the extent to which
[KKI] has joined with commercial interests, if it has, for the purposes of
profit, that might potentially impact upon the researchers' motivations
and potential conflicts of interest .... 6
The dearth of information in the record did not stop the Court from terming
the KKI researchers as "compensated."'"17 In discussing one of the reasons why a
researcher has a legal duty toward the subjects of research, the Court commented
that these "legal duties, and legal protections, might additionally be warranted
because of the likely conflict of interest between the goal of the research
experimenter and the health of the human subject, especially, but not exclusively,
when such research is commercialized." ' 18  The Court simply did not trust the
researchers' capacity to act against scientific interest in order to protect subjects.
For example, the Court took the view that the KKI researchers delayed disclosure
of elevated lead dust levels in order to avoid loss of study subjects."l 9
B. The Ethics of Research Generally
Undoubtedly, factors peculiar to this case help explain the Court's rhetorical
excess and condemnatory tone. It is apparent, for example, that an important
reason for the Court's fury was KKI's dogged insistence that it owed no duty to the
subjects. 120  In addition, the Court might have been influenced by the highly
publicized death of a research subject in an unrelated study at Johns Hopkins and
the brief suspension of federally funded research at Hopkins.' 2' Despite these
116. Id. at 840. The Court also mused about KKI's profit motive when the court rejected the trial
court's characterization of KKI as "an institutional volunteer in the community." Id. at 846. As the
Court put it, "it is not clear that the KKI was a mere volunteer in any event. It received funding for
developing and conducting the research. Whether it recognized a profit is unknown from the record.
The 'for profit' nature of some research may well increase the duties of researchers to ensure the safety
of research subjects, and may well increase researchers' or an institution's susceptibility for damages in
respect to any injuries incurred by the research subjects." Id.
117. See id. at 819, 823-24. Presumably, the Court was referring to the grant monies from the EPA.
See supra text accompanying note 7.
118. See id. at 850.
119. See id. at 823-24.
120. The Court quoted at extraordinary lengths excerpts from oral argument in which KKI's
counsel sought to defend the proposition that the trial court's decision on the absence of any duty of
care was correct. See id. at 829-32. The only conceivable purpose for devoting more than three pages
of small type in the Maryland Reports to this colloquy was to evidence the Court's astonishment at
KKI's persistence. KKI disavowed this position after the issuance of the Court's initial decision. See
supra note 79.
121. See Letter from Patrick J. McNeilly, Compliance Oversight Coordinator, Division of
Compliance Oversight, Office of Human Research Protections & Michael Carome, Director, Division
of Compliance Oversight, Office of Human Research Protections, to Edward D. Miller, Dean and Chief
Executive Officer, Johns Hopkins Medicine et al., July 19, 2001, available at
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specific motivations, however, the Court's critique extends more generally to the
means for protecting subjects that are relied upon within the research community.
The Court was scornful of the IRB's capacity or willingness to restrain overzealous
researchers and suggested that this deficiency is "endemic to the research
community as a whole."' 122 These "in-house organs," the Court remarked, "are not
designed, generally, to be sufficiently objective in the sense that they are as
sufficiently concerned with the ethicality of the experiments they review as they
are with the success of the experiments.'
23
The Court agreed with a commentator that the informed consent process
affords insufficient protection, given that researchers are "under competitive
pressure and also financial pressure from corporate backers."'124 In the Court's
own words, "The conflicts are inherent. This would be especially so when science
and private industry collaborate in search of material gains.' 25 The Court's deep
suspicion is evident in its infelicitously phrased remark: "to turn over human and
legal ethical concerns solely to the scientific community, is to risk embarking on
slippery slopes, that all too often in the past, here and elsewhere, have resulted in
practices we, or any community, should be ever unwilling to accept."'
126
Given the Court's dismissal of the research community's commitment to
ethical practices and the effectiveness of its self-regulatory apparatus, it is not
surprising that the Court would deem the potential of tort liability a necessary
deterrent of abusive research practices. Whatever else it does, the KKJ opinion will
encourage ongoing efforts by plaintiffs' lawyers to develop the tort of research
negligence.
127
C. The Court as Research Critic: A Failure of Self-Restraint
In the face of the Court's barrage, KKI protested that the Court not only
assumed the truth of all of the plaintiffs' facts but also discussed broader
propositions and historical comparisons about which, given the procedural posture
http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/detrm letrs/julO1a.pdf (last visited July 17, 2002). See also Dale Keiger &
Sue DePasquale, Trials and Tribulations: A Special Report, JOHNS HoPKINs MAG., Feb. 2002, at 28.
122. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813.
123. Id. at 817.
124. See id. at 839 (quoting Jeffery H. Barker, Human Experimentation and the Double
Facelessness of a Merciless Epoch, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 603, 617-20 (1999) (internal
quotations omitted)). In its characterizations of the ethics of the research enterprise, the Court relied
extensively on literature critical of aspects of current practice. In addition to the Barker article, see
generally Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject Experimentation, 19 J. LEGAL
MED. 157 (1998), and Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the
Ethics ofAutonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455 (1996).
125. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 817.
126. Id. at 853.
127. For a description of cases filed by the most active plaintiff's lawyer in this field, see Jennifer
Washburn, Informed Consent, WASH. POST MAG., Dec. 30, 2001, at 8.
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of the case, KKI had not been given any opportunity to respond.'28 The
inflammatory historical comparisons, in particular, were "fundamentally unfair,"
KKI rightly argued.1
29
Just as KKI protested, with reason, at the Court's one-sided account of its
research, so many others in the research community may bridle at the Court's
thinly supported generalizations about deficiencies in the supervision of human
subject research. As one commentator observed, "even a serious condemnation of
the [Johns Hopkins] IRB at that time does not necessarily justify the court's
sweeping condemnation of all IRBs and all intra-institutional attempts at human
subject protection."' 30
Of course, there are valid reasons to worry about the effectiveness of
informed consent, the adequacy of IRB oversight, and the potentially corrupting
effect of money on the system for protecting human subjects. The Court, however,
is institutionally disadvantaged in addressing these issues, for it has no inherent
expertise in the area and necessarily views the issues through the lens of a
particular case - here, a case that, owing to the inadequate record, actually clarified
little, even about the particular research activity that resulted in the litigation, let
alone research generally. Consequently, the Court's ethical critique, while forceful
and in places credible, suffers badly from imprecision and superficiality. The
Maryland Court of Appeals may be a sound court, but it has earned little credence
as a bioethics commission.
13 1
VI. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCHERS
Grimes is a landmark in the history of human subjects protections. It is the
most sweeping indictment of the current system of research protections ever
written by an American appellate court. In many respects, the Court's opinion is
also a landmark in judicial intemperance. For all of its flaws, however, the
decision is a clear warning to the research community to take nothing for granted
when conducting human subject research, especially research involving children or
other vulnerable subjects. Indeed, it is the second such warning, following that of
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court in TD. 132 If important
research is not to be stymied by the prospect of successful litigation (or, more
immediately, the inability to recruit subjects in a climate of mistrust), researchers
128. KKI Motion, supra note 78, at 1-2.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Ross, supra note 42, at 54.
131. A true bioethics commission, marshaling greater expertise and sophistication, has already
offered a more measured and insightful critique of the current system of research regulation. See NAT'L
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POL'Y ISSUES IN RES. INVOLVING HUM.. PARTICIPANTS
(2001), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edulnbac/human/overvoll.pdf (last visited Sept. 18,
2002).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
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and academic institutions must adopt safeguards to convince even the most
skeptical judicial observer of the ethical propriety of their research.
For the sake of both their ethical obligations and their pursuit of important
knowledge, pediatric and other researchers should take heed of the KKI decision,
surely not by abandoning their research but by redoubling their commitment to the
highest ethical standards. Specifically, researchers should:
" Exercise scrupulous care in characterizing the existence or degree of
potential benefit from participation in research.
* Exercise scrupulous care in characterizing the level of risk faced by
research participants.
" Devote genuine attention to minimizing whatever risks the
participants must bear for the sake of the scientific objective.
* Provide evidence within the research protocol of careful attention to
these issues of benefit and risk.
* Exercise scrupulous care in conducting a genuine informed consent
process, including the use of honest and understandable language in
consent documents.
" Ensure that procedures are in place, and are monitored, so that
information that has been promised to research participants, or that
may be material to their decision whether to continue to participate,
reaches the participants on time.
Research institutions, as well, should heed the warning of the KKI decision
by improving their processes and taking steps to promote public confidence in the
ethical conduct of their research. They should:
* Select IRB members who are capable of, and committed to, holding
researchers accountable for the actions identified above.
" Ensure adequate financial and staff support for their IRBs.
" Provide meaningful educational programs for investigators and IRB
members in the ethics of human subject research.
* Make the minutes of their IRBs available to members of the public
upon request, after redaction of genuinely confidential or privileged
information.
133
* Consider the creation of a regional or consortium IRB for the review
of protocols that have a higher than average risk profile, to diminish the
concern that an IRB is inherently biased toward approval in order to
promote the institution's cash flow.
133. Under recently enacted Maryland Law, and IRB "shall make the final minutes of a meeting
available for inspection within 30 days of a receipt of a request for the minutes from any person,"
although the IRB "may redact confidential or privileged information." MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §
13-2003 (West Supp. 2002).
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These actions by researchers and research institutions may be seen as
defensive, in that they are partly aimed at deterring lawsuits and avoiding
regulatory problems. In a more positive light, however, these improvements in the
methods for protecting research subjects would reflect fidelity to ethical standards
and would go some distance in restoring eroded public trust.
